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Torching the Relay 
May 4, 2008 in China Annals by The China Beat | 3 comments 
By Geremie R. Barmé 
[The following remarks were written in response to a series of questions from writers at Woroni, the 
paper produced by students at The Australian National University. They were drafted on April 28 and 
revised on May 3, 2008. I would add that I was travelling in China during the Australian leg of the 
Olympic Torch Relay. My thanks to Tom Swann of Woroni for inviting me to respond to his questions, 
and to Jeffrey Wasserstrom for suggesting that China Beat post this material.—GRB] 
Q: In general, the article will be asking: why was there such a powerful expression of 
Chinese nationalism in the Australian national capital, Canberra? We are guided by our 
personal observations that much of the protesting was overtly political and often 
antagonistic, which we think was not fully brought out in the media coverage. 
 
Geremie R. Barmé: Chinese demonstrators in Canberra would claim that they were giving 
voice to righteous patriotic (rather than the more negative “nationalistic”) sentiment in the face 
of deliberate distortions of the real situation in Tibetan China resulting from the “Western 
media” demonization of the People’s Republic of China, and the way the media had handled the 
March disturbances in Lhasa and elsewhere in what, for want of a better expression, I would call 
Tibetan China (that is the areas including the TAR, Qinghai, parts of Gansu, Sichuan, and 
Yunnan with large ethnic Tibetan populations). In the days leading up to the Canberra leg of the 
Olympic torch relay, Chinese organizers (both official and non-official) made the case to their 
fellows that Canberra is a city with a small population and that if patriotic Chinese did not turn 
up in numbers then protesters—“Tibet splittists” (to use the Chinese jargon), adherents of Falun 
Gong and a rag-bag of “anti-Chinese elements”—would make a big showing of “anti-Chinese” 
fervor in front of the national and international media. Only a large vocally patriotic Chinese 
presence could counter this. 
Furthermore, the demonstrators who made themselves so noisily felt and heard in Canberra had been 
inflamed by the disruptions of the relay in London, Paris, and San Francisco. They were also outraged 
by talk of a boycott of the Beijing Olympics opening on August 8 this year. These boisterous—and also 
very physical demonstrations—had been reported in the Chinese media and blogosphere with a level 
of emotional intensity bordering on the hysterical. Accounts in the official Chinese media were also 
highly colorful and employed the histrionic style of high-Maoist China (that is, the liberal use of 
morally laden terms of vituperation and condemnation—something I have written about in the chapter 
“Totalitarian Nostalgia” in my book In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture, Columbia 
University Press, 1999). During this process, the Olympic torch, something that should by all rights be 
regarded as a global symbol that belongs to the world community, increasingly became in the minds 
of many people a symbol of China and China alone. Indeed, the torch, or “sacred flame” (shenghuo) 
as it is referred to in Chinese (and for that matter Japanese, in which it is called seika), became a 
quasi-sacerdotal symbol of super-national Chinese identity. (I would refer readers to the recent biting 
comments made during a recent visit to Australia by the Beijing-based artist Ai Weiwei’s on what I 
would call the “hijacking of the sacred” by Beijing propagandists and those in their thrall. See his 
comments as quoted inThe Australian on April 30, 2008.) 
As we have witnessed in recent weeks, the issue of the Olympic Torch Relay has now become one of 
Chinese global pride, integrity, and national unity. The official Chinese media has also encouraged a 
kind of by-proxy witch-hunt to determine which among the foreign countries of “the West” (an ill-
defined category to say the least), their media, politicians, and public figures are, to use expressions 
first coined in the US media in 2005, “Panda huggers” (xiongmao pai, pro-China), “dragon slayers” 
(tulong pai, anti-China) or “Panda hedgers” (xiongmao qiqiang pai, undecided). Such terminology 
militates against subtlety of argument, nuance, shades of difference, or complexity on “both sides.” I 
would also note that the “unified caliber” (tongyi koujing) of Beijing-authored attacks on the “Western 
media” constitute a deliberate decision by the highest power in the land to use this opportunity to 
mount an all-out offensive on reporting on China by the independent media worldwide. I would 
speculate that this is a strategic decision made with the short-term tactical aim of neutralizing 
international media reports on China before and during the Olympic period—a time during which China 
has undertaken to allow unprecedented access of the international media to the country. The long-
term ramifications of this decision will be profound. 
Q: Are you able to provide any information about how it was reported, and viewed, in 
China? More generally, how is the torch relay being reported? 
 
GB: Over all, the relay in Canberra was reported as being a celebration of China and a 
resounding success. Large crowds waving flags of the People’s Republic of China and toting 
various slogans were shown on TV news. Naturally, within Australia there were many proud 
participants—and I think of Gill Hicks (who walks on prosthetic legs after having lost hers in the 
July 7 London bombings) and Ian Thorpe. However, as I remarked above, it is noteworthy that 
the torch relay has now been constructed as more a reflection of China’s global presence than 
merely being an activity supported by, and crucially involving, the international community. 
Chinese commentators have also noted that since the “Western” (Euramerican and Australian) media 
is basically run by prurient sensationalism and commercial concerns, it is hardly surprising that the 
story of protests surrounding the Olympic relay has concentrated on shrill protests and the activities of 
what are invariably referred to as a “small handful” of “Tibetan splittists” and other “anti-Chinese 
elements.” More broadly, the Chinese state and semi-independent media have spoken darkly of the 
existence of an “international conspiracy” against China, one that covertly reflects irrational fears of 
China’s rise as an economic and political superpower. According to this logic, the contretemps 
surrounding the Beijing Olympics is merely the latest platform for the conspirators. Many Chinese 
writing on the net, or who I have encountered since March (I was in Beijing during the original Lhasa 
disturbances, and have travelled to a number of cities in China since then on a second trip—for 
reasons unrelated to these issues) also point out that they feel that China is not given due credit for 
the extraordinary changes that have swept the nation in recent decades that have seen the mass 
alleviation of poverty and the rapid modernization of the largest nation on earth. However, while 
conspiracy theories make for good copy, they don’t help us understand the situation, or the long-term 
causes of the present rhetorical extremes both in China and elsewhere. Indeed, I would hasten to 
point out that media paranoia and hysteria is hardly something limited to China, and it would appear 
that many commentators and opinion-makers internationally have joined in the fray with enthusiasm. 
The early reports of the London and Paris melees in the Chinese media moved from avoiding mention 
of the disruptions to propagating the righteous outrage of the international Chinese community (much 
of which consists of mainland Chinese students living and studying overseas), and the heroic spirit of 
martyrdom evinced by Jin Jing, the handicapped torch-bearer who was lunged at during the Paris 
relay (she quickly fell from grace when she had the temerity to oppose a mainland Chinese boycott of 
the French-owned Carrefour chain—critics widely attacked her: “not only doesn’t she have a leg, she 
doesn’t even have a brain!” has been a commonly heard tagline). The Chinese media treated these 
early protests as the disruptive activities of “a small minority” (yi xiaocuo) worthy of nothing more 
than contempt. It should be noted that after the spontaneous protests in China itself against Carrefour 
in mid April, the authorities began to calm things down by calling on people to engage in “rational 
patriotism” that did not impinge on the economic weal of the nation. This is a common tactic that we 
have seen deployed any number of times (see, for example, my 2005 article “Mirrors of History,” 
reposted on May 2 by danwei.org). For their part, the owners of Carrefour were quick to claim 
their pro-China, pro-Olympics stance and express outrage and disgust at the events in Paris. 
Q: What does the Olympics mean to the Chinese people? (Many of the protesters, and 
people in the media, talked in terms of one-world spirit and so on). 
 
GB: Put simply, one could argue that the 2008 Beijing Olympics have been turned into a 
celebration of the People’s Republic of China’s emergence as a major global force. Years of 
propaganda, educational hype, and commercial spruiking by the Chinese party-state, the 
commercial media and international corporations who want to make a buck (or two, or millions) 
have added to the crescendo of hope, pride and national hubris bound up in a heady embrace 
during this the Olympic year [ed. note: “spruik” is of Australian origin and means to promote in 
public]. Extraordinary investment has gone into the physical sites of the games as well as into the 
redevelopment (and further despoliation) of Beijing. Voices of discord, disagreement, or doubt 
have never enjoyed any airtime. Those deprived of their homes or livelihoods as a result of the 
grand plan for the Olympics are generally mute, and “Olympic doubters” are in a minority. 
Those who might have concerns have no way of knowing how widely held their disquiet may be. 
China is not a pluralistic society, its media is guided, and its public opinion manufactured (again, 
this is a topic about which I have written at length elsewhere). So-called “public sentiment” 
(gongzhong yulun) is, I would argue, the result of long years of careful engineering. What is 
particularly unsettling for the uninformed observer is that those who mouth with unanimity 
views supported by the party-state are relatively complicit in their unreflective cooptation. I 
observed in my 1999 book In the Red mentioned earlier: 
“As the children of the Cultural Revolution and the Reform era come into power and money they are 
finding a new sense of self-importance and worth. They are resentful of the real and imagined slights 
that they and their nation have suffered in the past, and their desire for strength and revenge is 
increasingly reflected in contemporary Chinese culture. Unofficial culture has reached or is reaching an 
uncomfortable accommodation with the economic if not always the political realities of contemporary 
China. As its practitioners negotiate a relationship with both the state in all of its complex 
manifestations and capital (often, but not always, the same thing) national pride and achievement act 
as a glue that further seals the pact. The patriotic consensus, aptly manipulated by diverse Party 
organs, acts as a crucial element in the coherence of the otherwise increasingly fragmented Chinese 
world.” [From the chapter “To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic” which, when first published as an article 
in July 1995, bore the subtitle “China’s Avant-garde Nationalists.” See also the same book for the 
appendix entitled “Screw You, Too.”] 
Q: How is the issue of Tibet viewed within China? Or other geo-political issues with which 
China is involved? By Chinese outside of China? Many have said that they think that the 
Western media is deliberately manipulating coverage of how China proceeds in its political 
issues. 
 
GB: The issues of Tibet, or more generally of “Tibetan China” (that is the territories in China 
with large ethnically Tibetan populations in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan), are 
extremely complex. While the Chinese official story fixates on the bloodshed of March 14 and 
the activities of agitators for Tibetan independence, it judiciously avoids discussion of the 
protests in the other dozens of towns and cities with large Tibetan populations, or the state 
violence and extrajudicial punishments meted out in the process. Nor is any real attempt made to 
help the public understand how or why such widespread and, in the main, peaceful protests could 
have taken place apart from ascribing them to the “premeditated plots” of the “Dalai clique.” In 
the Chinese media there is now a propaganda push to extol tirelessly China’s constant 
contributions to the Tibetans and their material prosperity; there is scant evidence of there being 
any willingness to concede that there could be any reason whatsoever for anyone to protest about 
anything. No one asks whether the aggressive modernization foisted on the Tibetans (and 
enjoyed by many, but concomitantly a process that has created numerous iniquities and 
problems) should be questioned. With that as the rhetorical backdrop to all reporting in China 
then protest, even if peaceful and moderate, must invariably be depicted as the result of the 
callous manipulations of the dreaded “Dalai clique” and their shameful desire to see China rent 
apart, or for a restoration of the old lama-dominated theocracy of pre-1950s Tibet. For an 
excellent article on the rhetorical (and policy) dead-end that results from this kind of 
argumentation, see Isabel Hilton’s April 12, 2008 article “Ditch the Tatty Flag of Nationalism.” 
Most people know nothing more of the Tibetan realm than a few songs and dances, a few famous 
spots and glib ideas about Tibetan Buddhism. They certainly know little about the economic 
displacement that seems to be a major issue for some protesters, or of the effects of forced 
sedenterization of nomad communities, or the new Party control of the selection of reincarnated 
lamas, all issues of great importance for people in the Tibetan areas. Chinese comments I generally 
hear are of a kind that we in Australia are familiar with from the days of Pauline Hanson (a right-wing 
parliamentarian active from 1996 who helped during the long-years of the Howard Coalition 
government to shift public debate to the right): remember when Aborigines were derided for being 
bludgers on the social security system of “mainstream Australia”? Remember too that for all of the 
social and economic problems of Aboriginal communities, they were blamed for their own dire straits 
and attacked for “having it so good” while “average Australians” were “doing it hard on 
strugglestreet”? Similarly, I have often heard people say in recent weeks that the Tibetans have it so 
good and are freer than mainstream Han Chinese; they should be grateful for all the largesse they 
enjoy. Issues of socio-economic importance or questions of legitimate cultural and religious concerns 
seem to be virtually ignored in the mainstream Chinese media, nor are the actual on-the-ground 
policies debated in the public realm (they are daresay the subject of far more considered discussion 
behind closed doors). That the public is deprived of informed information and open discussion is an 
inevitable reality in a constrained media environment. 
On this same anecdotal level, I have encountered common expressions of contempt for Tibetans as an 
ethnic group (that is, that they are “backward,” with “low IQs,” are “dirty” and “resistant to 
modernity”) since I was first a student in China in the mid 1970s. But I would also note that, Tibet-
fascination—for its culture, landscape, religion and social relations—has also been a common feature 
of Han culture (alternative and mainstream) since the mid 1980s (see, for example, the material that 
John Minford and I included in the 1988 second edition of our Seeds of Fire, Chinese Voices of 
Conscience). It is also said that there are numerous Han converts to Tibetan Buddhism, people who 
are among the many who are searching for some greater human meaning beyond the arid landscape 
of material acquisition that is the predominant feature of mainstream consumerism. 
One of the crucially complicating factors related to events since the initial demonstrations in Lhasa on 
March 10 (these were peaceful protests that preceded the mob violence of March 14 and the 
widespread unrest and crackdown ever since) was that the Chinese authorities enforced a blackout 
that kept the Western media out of Lhasa and then restricted access to virtually most of Tibetan 
China. A lack of media freedom, and sensationalism, as well as state guided propaganda and 
emotionalism have added to the escalation of rhetorical violence and blind prejudice all around. For 
many Western media outlets, the media blackout and sensational circumstances of the torch relay 
have fed the frenzy. A cogent and measured reflection on the official responses to March 14 is the 12-
point petitionissued on March 22 by leading Chinese intellectuals and public figures. It remains 
essential reading. 
Q: Some protesters were angry that white/non-Chinese Australians were protesting in the 
name of Tibet. Can you shed light on this? 
 
GB: This is an added unpleasantness to an already unpalatable situation. Regardless of where 
one stands on issues related to the Tibetan question, freedom of speech, peaceful protest, and 
demonstration are guaranteed under Australian law. It is unfortunate in the extreme that in my 
home city of Canberra Chinese protesters—the majority of whom it would seem are not 
Australian citizens, although they naturally enjoy basic rights guaranteed under Australian law—
have attempted to curtail or deny others the right to protest peacefully on non-Chinese sovereign 
soil. Sadly, perhaps even tragically given the scale of the perceptions now generated, many 
observers feel they have seen a sort of “export authoritarianism” masquerading as Chinese 
patriotism. A lot of work will have to be done to ameliorate this distasteful impression. It is 
noteworthy that some bloggers in China are also disgusted by the self-indulgent rhetorical 
hysteria of their (generally) middle-class countrymen and women overseas. They say that they’d 
like to see them go back to China and fight for political reform, media freedom, and human 
rights on home turf rather than making an hubristic spectacle of themselves internationally. 
Indeed, if China enjoyed true intellectual, media and political pluralism it would be possible to 
have a more rational and reasonable discussion of whether non-Chinese or non-Tibetan 
Australians have a right to express publicly their views on matters of international concern. 
Given the present state of affairs, this is simply not the case. 
Q: Some have claimed that Tibet has long been part of China. Why? Or, would you say 
there is any academically recognized truth in this? 
 
GB: The era of the nation state began for the territory of the Qing empire (the last Chinese 
dynasty, 1644-1911) in the mid nineteenth century. Like other modern countries “China” is a 
relatively recent construct as a modern nation-state. Prior to this time the sway of imperial rule, 
the relations between different imperial courts and bordering states or tributary states is what 
determined issues of territory. To project anachronistic views regarding the territory of the 
present People’s Republic of China into the distant past is a dubious undertaking at best. 
Similarly, to claim a unique independence for the territories of “Tibet” or “Greater Tibet” in the 
context of the imperial era is spurious. Although there were moves for an independent nation-
state status for Tibet during the first half of the twentieth century (especially under the influence 
of the British imperium), such a status was not achieved in practical terms. For a study of the 
relations of the Tibetan areas of contemporary China to dynastic empires from the Mongol Yuan 
era (thirteenth century) to the high Qing (mid eighteenth century), I would refer your readers to 
the excellent work of the late historian F.W. Mote of Princeton University (see his Imperial 
China, 900-1800, Harvard University Press, 1999). 
Furthermore, I would note that there is a dearth of independent scholarship on this subject of note in 
the People’s Republic as all historians and their research must conform to the official party-state line 
when dealing with issues of Chinese territorial integrity. This makes it particularly difficult for readers 
of Chinese alone to acquaint themselves with the rigorous, objective, and painstaking research that 
has been done on such issues by international scholars (not just English language scholarship), 
especially as the work of such scholars when produced in Chinese translation is usually censored or 
“cosmetically edited” when it touches on sensitive issues. 
Q: Can you say anything about the concept of “motherland”? 
GB: The “motherland” or in Chinese “zuguo,” which could also be translated as “fatherland,” a term 
with uncomfortable connotations in English, actually means “land of [one’s] ancestors.” It is a term 
and concept created in Japanese and Chinese during the era of Western imperial politics in the 
nineteenth century (see above). It has gained increased force in China over the past twenty years as 
the Chinese party-state (that is the nation which is run by a one-party system) has promoted 
patriotism as a positive unifying force, in particular through constant “patriotic education” (aiguo 
jiaoyu) classes from primary school onwards and popular movements that see party propaganda, 
patriotic sentiment and slick commercialism combined (see the chapter ‘CCPä & Adcult PRC’ in my In 
the Red). 
Q: We find it ironic, and concerning, that many protesters were rejecting politicization but 
responding with further, at times quite explicit politicization; that they were responding to 
claims of violence on behalf of their government with antagonism and intimidation; that 
they were protesting for the cause of an autocratic government under the protection of a 
foreign democratic one. Do you think Chinese political culture is cognizant of such 
contradictions? 
 
GB: One of the underlying elements of mob patriotism/nationalism in any highly charged 
environment is the lack of self-reflection. We see careful thought abandoned; there is an 
indulgence in emotionalism and the mindless drift towards extreme and simplistic responses to 
what are generally complex issues. The politics of the Games itself are fraught, and now more so 
than ever. The Chinese media in the PRC has never been clear about the various undertakings 
that were made to the international community to ameliorate the human rights situation in China 
prior to the 2008 Games, and so most people have no idea that the constant news of human rights 
abuses coming from China (the appalling Hu Jia case being only the most recently well-
advertised case: see the enlightening article “Hu Jia in China’s Legal Labyrinth” by Jerome A. 
Cohen and Eva Pils in the early May 2008 issue of Far Eastern Economic Review) have formed 
over some time a very negative backdrop to the recent Tibet issue. 
It has been a great source of regret to many of us that the strident and vociferous activities of large 
mobs of Chinese “patriots” since London and Paris have so profoundly tarnished the image of China’s 
young people internationally. Furthermore, some have pointed out that the high-decibel denunciations 
of any who voice opinions not in keeping with what is dubbed “mainstream [Chinese] opinion” (zhuliu 
minyi) have created the impression that people in China and abroad are expected to support 
unquestioningly the People’s Republic of China, and all of its policies, regardless (for an approach that 
mitigates against such compliance, see the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s speech to the 
students of Peking University, April 9, 2008, and my April 12 analysis of it, “Rudd Rewrites the Rules 
of Engagement”). Doubts, questioning and informed discussion are, at present, not tolerated. 
Independent commentators in China have noted that while rabid patriotic Chinese demonstrators 
have enjoyed the right to protest internationally under the protection of the police of their 
resident countries, and with the full enjoyment of democratic freedoms that Western bourgeois 
democracies allow, in China they would enjoy no such freedoms. 
Q: Questions of violence and intimidation aside, would you say that the show of support for 
China’s Olympics, and the sense of national pride, and the sense of the need to protect it 
internationally, is shared by most Chinese? 
GB: It is impossible to gauge what “most Chinese” think or feel, as there is no means of making such 
assessments. I would imagine that there is widespread pride in the Olympics and a fervent hope that 
the year passes without further incident. However, I would note that a people that has had a history 
of mass movements, agitations, rallies, and mob agitation for nigh on a century now, will not resile 
from further displays of collective anger and raucous protest. The Olympics will now be fraught and 
there will inevitably been extreme official paranoia generated by the fear that some athlete, or visitor, 
or even playful prankster, will unfurl a Tibetan flag or shout “Free Tibet” at some moment during the 
Olympics—be it in the main sports venues, or anywhere in Beijing. Everyone will have to pay the price 
for this in advance through over-zealous security measures and a virtual state of martial law. This will 
make for a baleful environment indeed. But elsewhere I have pointed out that “harmonious society” is 
a laden concept, one that consists of political tutelage, social quiescence and commercial frenzy, 
among other things. 
I would further point out that many Chinese interlocutors are often more than happy to tell you what 
“We Chinese” feel or believe on any given topic. Given the lack of media freedom or true transparency 
in the Chinese public realm (added to by the shifting rhetorical ground of internet bloggers and 
commentators), claims that assert that individuals are able to represent anything but personal (even if 
it is “bestowed”) opinion are, needless to say, risible. 
Geremie R. Barmé is a professor of Chinese history at The Australian National University, Canberra. 
He is the editor of China Heritage Quarterly, and his latest book, The Forbidden City, was just 
released in North America by Harvard University Press. 
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